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INTRODUCTION
Some Western scholars believe that Islam and
democracy are incompatible in essence (Lewis, 2010;
Fish, 2002). It is suggested that the principles of
democracy and the basic nature of Islamic polity are
extremely different. In response to this, many other
scholars formulate feedback theory, saying that it is
not the doctrine of Islam that leads Muslim states
become undemocratic. Bayat for example, maintains
that it is the intellectual belief and political capacity of
the political actors that account for the absence of
democracy in a Muslim country, instead of doctrine of
Islam itself (Bayat, 2007: 17). Likewise, Ahmed Kuru
proposes another notion concerning the reason
behind the absence of democracy. He believes in
geographic and geologic determinism, saying that the
abundance of natural resources, regardless of whether
it is in a Muslim or non-Muslim country, creates the
undemocratic system of a country. This lavishness of
wealth, he argues, establishes patron-client relation
between the ruled and the ruler (Kuru, 2014). This
theory implies, if the economy of a state relies on
taxation, rather than natural resources, then democ-
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was successful in Egypt and failed in Turkey. In order to answer these questions, this paper reviews some aspects related to social condition and the
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racy will exist strongly. Lastly, Esposito contends that
like all other religions, Islam has a full spectrum of
potential symbols and concepts for democracy.
However, he argues, each Muslim-majority country has
a distinctive experience in achieving a democratic
system that cannot be assessed by the western defini-
tion of democracy (Esposito, 2016). Therefore, the
absence of democracy in some Muslim countries does
not necessarily mean that Islam contradicts democ-
racy.
Recently, we witness the rise of hope for democracy
in Muslim countries, especially in the Middle East
since the Arab Spring which started in 2011 and has
toppled the autocrat regimes in the region. Ranging
from Tunisia, followed by Egypt, Libya, Yemen and
Syria, the wave of revolution gave a new optimism for
political change in those Arab countries amid crisis.
After six years, the achievement of each revolution
differs from one country to another, but mostly was
still beyond expectation. Accordingly, Libya and
Yemen suffered from civil wars, despite the fact that
Qadafi and Saleh had been overthrown. Syria became
the field of proxy war between the two blocs of
Muslim country and the dictator, Assad who remains
in his throne. Only the experience of Tunisia demon-
strated the positive accomplishments of democracy
and thus became the model for other countries in
Middle East as well as North Africa.
In the case of Egypt, the revolution was hijacked by
the military generals. At the beginning, given its
position as the most powerful and influential Arab
country at the time, there existed a greater expectation
for the change. In the early 2011, when the protestors
who gathered from various backgrounds and success-
fully ousted Mubarak – the tyrannical ruler for 30
years—, many believed that the future of Egypt would
be brighter. This was subsequently and further ratio-
nalized by the achievement, whereby for the first time
in the history of Egypt, a fair presidential election was
magnificently held. However, what happened in reality
was the opposite of the hope. In fact, political and
social culture of Egypt was not ready enough to
embrace the true democratic system. Finally, in the
name of stabilizing the political situation in Egypt,
military generals raised a coup which ousted the first
democratically elected president in the country.
Consequently, the result of the military coup marked
the turning point of Egypt’s immature democracy and
heralded a return to autocrat regime.
After the experience of failed democracy in Egypt
along with in other Middle East countries during the
Arab Spring, Turkey then became the next hope for
achieving democratic political change. Many analysts
believe that Turkey has succeeded in transforming not
only their economic condition, but also the face of
Islamism (Dagi, 2013). It is no doubt that the person
behind the rising optimism of democratization in
Turkey was the former prime minister and now the
current president, Recep Tayib Erdogan. There are at
least two strong reasons why this figure is worthy of
respect and why he gained support of the Turks several
times in the elections. Firstly, Erdogan was the first
strong leader in Turkey who could weaken the role
and influence of the military. It seems that the Turkey
population has no more faith in the armed forces. The
reason being that for almost a century the military had
led the country within a secular system and the fate of
Turkey remained unfortunate. Secondly, Erdogan has
productively improved the economy of Turkey. Before
the Erdogan presidency, Turkey was a weak state. But
because of his strong commitment to be part of the
European Union (EU), coupled with the strong and
effective leadership, Turkey then became one of G-20
(Patton, 2006). However, after three periods of leader-
ship, Erdogan began to show distinct authoritarian
tendencies. Thus, this situation prompted the military
to undertake the coup which dramatically occurred in
the last 15th July. Though the attempted coup failed,
many still believe that the democratization of Turkey is
under threat and may be experiencing a setback.
In the wake of reflections about the failed military
coup in Turkey, there occur some writings that
intended to find similarities in its failure with that of
failed coup in Egypt. While some emphasize its
similarities over the actual differences, other does the
opposite (Shapiro, 2016; Ashour, 2016). Similarly,
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this article will compare the military coups that
occurred in both Egypt and Turkey, but in a more
depth analysis. The examination of these two coup
d’états is justified by the following reasons. Firstly,
because they are remarkable events in the history of
democratization in the Muslim world. Although we
will never refer to the thesis of Huntington about
discordancy between democracy and Islam, these two
experiences showed that the process of becoming a
democratic country is still a faraway off and will take
long time to achieve. In addition, by examining the
two coups, we may be able to understand the map
and the future of democracy in the region. Secondly,
this writing will aim to propose an answer to the
question “why the coup, as the serious constraint of
democracy, happened recurrently in the Muslim
world”.
Given the considerations as above this paper will
answer these two following questions: Firstly, what
were the causes for the coup of Egypt and Turkey?
Secondly, why was the military coup successful in
Egypt while failed in Turkey? In order to answer these
proposed questions, this paper will reveal similarities
and differences between the military coups of both
Egypt and Turkey and examined them comparatively.
ANALYSES
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
Besides the different endings of both coups, in fact
there are several other points that distinguish the
military coup of Egypt in relation to that of Turkey.
The most important point to consider before any
other factors, is the triggering factor of the coups,
integrated within an evaluation and comparison of the
economic achievements of both ruling regimes. Morsi,
due to his short government, failed to overcome the
economic crisis that Egypt had been suffering since the
fall of Mubarak. The New York Times even named the
situation as the worst economic crisis since 1930s
(Kingsley, 2016). The crisis was marked by the pres-
ence of the rising unemployment of youth, a drastic
fall in both foreign investment and revenues from
tourism, followed by a 60% drop in foreign exchange
reserves, 3% drop in growth, and a rapid devaluation
of the Egyptian pound (Kingsley, 2016). The unem-
ployment figures in the time of the Morsi Presidency
reached 850,000 people (Singh, 2013). Moreover, at
the same time, the cost of living soared tremendously
and resulted in ordinary Egyptians living under
unbearable pressure. In general terms, during the
Morsi’s term the economy was in a radical decline.
Enduring this situation, Egyptians showed and
expressed their frustration and anger toward the
governing regime, even though Morsi’s tenure was still
only a year old. This was because he was the only one
who could be blamed. However, there was another
theory which existed, that it was military and other
opponents of Morsi from the remnants of the previ-
ous regime who had purposely plotted the economic
crisis. There were several facts that affirm this suspi-
cion, such as the sudden disappearance of a gas line
during the turmoil and the resultant appearance of
power cuts (Maass, 2013). Above all, regardless of who
were responsible, the crisis was not rectified. The
Egyptian people, who were actually highly pragmatic
and not ideologically attached to Morsi, became
intolerant of the crisis. As a result of the instability
and this economic crisis, the Supreme Council of
Armed Forces (SCAF) considered themselves to be
justified to seize the power.
Unlike the Egypt, the economy of Turkey during
the tenure of Erdogan was quite positive. Erdogan and
his party, Justice and Development Party (AKP),
significantly raised the social welfare of the nation.
During his reign, there has been a great success in
terms of economic stability and improvement (Yulek,
2015). Perhaps this is partly due to his long period of
administration, starting from 2002 to 2014. It is
acknowledged that since he came to power, the
economic growth of Turkey has averaged some 5%.
Moreover, inflation has been controlled. Maybe this
was just possible because his strong commitment to
be a member of European Union (EU) (Ismahan,
2016).
In 2016, despite the slight decrease in economic
development, on account of some acts of ISIS terror
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and the worsened tie with Russia, the overall eco-
nomic conditions in Turkey were actually still positive
and satisfactory enough for Turks. This economic
achievement was undoubtedly a strong factor that
strengthened the bargaining position of Erdogan with
his political enemies. In relation to this, an analyst
suggests that the handout that Turks receive from their
government, not Islamism ideology, was the cause
most liable for improved support from Turks to
Erdogan and contributed a real constraint upon the
military’s potential efforts to topple him and bring
him down (Emre, 2016).
However, there is still one remaining question. But
why the fact that the economy of Turkey was strong
and not in crisis, did not prevent the military from
undertaking the coup? At this point, we can assume
that the spectacle used to understand the Egyptian
coup, i.e. economic determinism, is useless.
THE NATURE OF OPPOSITION MOVEMENT
The second matter that distinguishes the experience
of Egypt and Turkey is the nature of opposition
movement in terms of their view toward the military
coup. As the ruling regimes, Morsi and Erdogan were
surrounded by the oppositional forces. However,
unlike Erdogan who had enough strength around him,
Morsi was almost without allies. As a matter of fact,
Morsi’s administration witnessed not only the absence
of the so called “loyal opposition”, but also the
existence of “dedicated partners”. In the beginning of
his term, Morsi established a coalition comprising of
his party, Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and al-Nour
party, another Islamist political group in Egypt.
However, in the course of time, when Morsi seemed to
have lost legitimacy, al-Nour broke the coalition,
which left Morsi behind and alone. Surprisingly, the
al-Azhar institution, which had strong influence on
the civil society of Egypt, also abandoned Morsi,
arguing that by doing so they were avoiding civil strife.
The fact that Morsi was an Islamist political leader was
not taken into consideration by sheikh al-Azhar when
he justified the right of the army to topple Morsi.
In addition, mention must be made of the political
behavior of Morsi’s opposition. They did not only
dissent every single of Morsi’s policies, but more than
that, they also set up the Tamarrod movement with the
main goal of removing Morsi altogether. Overall,
Morsi faced a very strong opposition movement that
consisted of many groups including the remnant of
Mubarak bureaucrats, the secular or leftist groups and
the youth movement. The main objective of the first
opposition group was to defend the Mubarak legacy
from every radical policy coming from Morsi, while
objective of the secular or leftist groups was to sepa-
rate the national identity from Islamism ideology.
Meanwhile, the youth movement was motivated
mainly by their disappointment with Morsi’s tyranni-
cal tendencies. In addition, Morsi also witnessed
betrayal by the intelligentsia, who in their discourse
always spoke about democracy but their behavior was
less than democratic. Above all, Morsi antagonized the
military corps who had their own interests, which
were to preserve their privileges within Egyptian
economy and politic. Finally, with the accumulation
of the withdrawal of allies, the absence of support
from al-Azhar in addition to the lack of loyal opposi-
tion ultimately, the coup was instigated by the mili-
tary.
The Turkey’s experience was different to that of
Egypt. Erdogan is a strong leader. Some writers suggest
that his strength is only comparable to Mustafa Kamal
Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey (Kuru A.,
2015). Erdogan won the election in the four consecu-
tive elections. In the last election held in 2014,
Erdogan’s party gained 52 percent of the votes. In the
2011 election, he also received half of Turkey’s
citizen’s votes. This support made him quite secured
from any attempt by the military to instigate a coup.
Apart from this however, there are actually several
groups who were always critical of Erdogan. The most
prominent among these was the secularist group who
embraced the ideology of Kemalism. Erdogan’s
oppositionists are represented by the Republican
People’s Party (CHP), the Nationalist Movement
Party (MHP) and the Peoples’ Democratic
Party (HDP). Unpredictably, however, not a single
141
opposition party supported the attempted coup.
Though they were in opposition to Erdogan, even
within that context they refused to support military
coup which they thought would result in destroying
the democracy of the country. They believed that the
price Turkey would pay would be considerably higher
if a civil war occurred (Daily Sabah Politics, 2016). In
fact, this phenomenon is very surprising, as within this
highly polarized political landscape, the opposition
movement had bound themselves with the national
interest of Turkey.
THE UNITY OF MILITARY
Another remarkable feature that differentiates the
coups of each country is centered on the unity of
armed forces. It is worthwhile to note that in both
contexts, the military have strategic positions, as the
guardian of secularism in Turkey’s case and in Egypt’s
case, as the owner of and controller power over the
economy of nation. In addition, both military have
had a long successful history in terms of overthrowing
their respective governments. The armed forces of
Egypt ousted King Faruq in 1952, which ended the
system of monarchy in the country, and finally in
2013 the Egyptian army ousted the first democrati-
cally elected President. The army of Turkey had had
greater experiences in terms of removing rulers,
starting from 1960 when a coup that ended with the
execution of Adnan Manderes, continued by the
smooth coup in 1970 and followed by the bloodiest
one in 1980, which executed 50 persons. The last
attempt of coup before Erdogan’s administration
occurred in 1997 (Emre, 2016). Prior to the 2016
coup, the Turkey military has also attempted several
times to overthrow Erdogan’s government, namely in
2007, 2012, and 2013 (Espostio, 2016: 41). Interest-
ingly in each attempted coup, however, Erdogan has
successfully eliminated the involved military officers.
In regards to the latest coup, it is highly noticeable
that military generals were divided. It appears there
were only a small number of military officers who
supported the removal of Erdogan. More importantly,
also the highest general in the Army rejected the coup.
As a matter of fact the coup movement was led by
Colonel Muharrem Kose. The disunity of military
forces is without a doubt the most determining factor
behind the failure of the coup. The important relevant
question related to the disunity is, why was there a
split among them? There are at least some possible
answers for this. Firstly, the conviction by Erdogan
was that those who rebelled against him were the
followers of Gulen and they were a small quantity.
This means that Erdogan acknowledged that the army
has been infiltrated. However, there are many doubts
concerning this accusation, given that Gulen is a
moderate person who always condemns and resists
military influence in the political activities of the state
(Fuller, 2016). Secondly, the split among Turkey
soldiers stems from their view of Erdogan’s leadership.
Some perhaps respected his positive achievement,
especially in terms of economic matters, while others
saw and objected to his authoritarian tendency.
Thirdly, majority of army officers who resisted the
coup, more than likely considered the limited possibil-
ity of a successful coup, taking into account the failed
previous attempts which ended up with total deten-
tion of the officers by Erdogan. Those who fought
against him, therefore, had no settled and clear plan,
only an immature plot.
In comparison, in its attempted Egyptian coup, the
Egyptian army was more solid and unified than the
army in Turkey. Despite the fact that the Abdul Fattah
al-Sisi, the military general who deposed Morsi, was a
new commander of SCAF as well the youngest of
them and who replaced the old field Marshal
Mohammed Husein at-Thanthawi, this did not
prevent the more senior officers from obeying him. As
a matter of fact, the event of any split among Egyptian
military had never occurred since the era of President
Anwar Sadat.
Taking into consideration on this fact, the same
question arises, why was no similar division among the
SCAF of Egypt? There are several possible answers for
this. Firstly, it was due to strong position of SCAF
under strong generals itself. In the wake of Arab
Spring, according to the new Egyptian Constitution,
JURNAL HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
VOL. 5 EDISI 2 / OKTOBER 2016-MARET 2017142
the army still could enjoy the privileges of power
where they could have control over their own military
affairs. Unlike the Turkish Army, which in the course
of time had been weakening by Erdogan, the SCAF of
Egypt is still highly untouchable even until now. In
addition to this, they also receive annual military aid
from the USA. Secondly, because since the era of the
Nasser presidency, the country had been led by the
presidents whose background was also military. Under
the tenure of military presidents, the army had easily
consolidated themselves. This is incomparable to the
military situation in Turkey where a split occurred
because the army was led by the civilian. In conclusion
and more importantly, the unity of the army eased the
process of the coup d’état of President Morsi.
THE CIVIL RESPONSE
Egyptian people, with the influence of al-Azhar are
largely an Islamic society. To some extent, this is
similar to the Turks, who recently and especially after
AKP’s effect, became more religious than in the
previous decades. Although similar in terms of religios-
ity, however, the responses of the two societies to the
coups were different. Egyptian clerics, based on their
long historical tradition of the Asharite school of
thought they had been embracing, issued a fatwa and
delivered opinions supporting the conduct of General
al-Sisi (al-Azami). They argued, that in order to avoid
fitna (civil disorder), they needed to endorse military
action (al-Azami, 2015). This gave the justification for
the masses to gather in Tahrir Square. No matter how
democratic Morsi was elected, they considered that his
presidency had lost its true legitimation because it
lacked evidence of the support of the people. Sheikh
al-Azhar, Ahmed Toyib, along with the Christian
Coptic leader all stood behind al-Sisi in legitimizing
his position and when this General declared the
deposing Morsi (Shahine, 2016). Syekh Ali Gom’ah,
the former mufti of Egypt, also gave a speech to the
military troops supporting their action in dissolving
the mass demonstration and justifying that the using
of violence resulted in the death of thousand people
(al-Azami, 2015). There was only dissenting opinion
for this coup and from one Egyptian scholar, Yusuf
Qaradawi. However his voice was neglected and he was
lack of influence. His ineffectiveness was perhaps due
to his residence being outside Egypt and his tendency
to support the Moslem Brotherhood from where
Morsi originated.
Unlike the Moslem scholars of Egypt, those of
Turkey rejected the coup. Moreover, unlike ulama of
al-Azhar who quoted the discourse of ilm kalam
(Islamic theology) pertaining to legitimate ruler and
the kharijite (rebellious), there was no theological
consideration or justification behind the positive
stance of Turk clergies. This was highly likely explained
by the fact that Turkey itself was a secular state, so that
the use of specific religious arguments in political
debate is uncommon. In addition, it was still doubted
that it was effective. However, to some extent, those
who resisted the coup still used general Islamic
expressions, such as the slogan of Allahu Akbar (God is
the Greatest) (Tremblay, 2016). Above all, the support
of Mehmet Gormez, head of the Religious Affairs
Directorate for Erdogan and Erdogan’s call for Turks
to come to street, is clear evidence that the civil
society as well as religious groups were resisting the
coup. It is also highly likely, however, that the resis-
tance of all Turks was not because of religious consid-
eration although religion slogan was vocalized, but
rather based on pragmatic reasons and considerations
that living under military regime would worsen the
situation. Also, the resistance of the Turks to the coup
did not necessarily mean that they supported Erdogan,
but rather their overall propensity toward democracy.
THE UNDEMOCRATIC POLICIES
Erdogan was the pride of Turkey in his first two
terms. However, according to Ahmed Kuru, after
2011, although Turkey still experienced stunning
economic growth, Erdogan had moved toward
authoritarianism, Islamist populism and crony capital-
ism (Kuru A., 2015). Prior to the coup of 2016, there
were several actions by Erdogan that crushed the
democracy in Turkey. In 2012, for example, Erdogan
proposed amendment of the constitution, trying to
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create a super powerful President who could legislate
when the parliament was not in session and who was
able to appoint two-thirds of the high court judges
(Espostio, 2016: 41). As a result of those actions,
Erdogan was charged by the opposition of strengthen-
ing the Presidency over the parliamentary system. He
was accused of trying to fuse the executive with the
legislative and judiciary. However, Erdogan frequently
used the language of Western conspiracy theory in
order to face his opponents.
In 2013, Erdogan was involved in a serious clash
with his opponents because of his policy removing a
park in Istanbul and replacing it with a mall and
residency. Erdogan threatened the protestors by
labeling them as secularists and under the influence of
alcohol. In the same year, Erdogan was accused by the
prosecutors of corruption on several issues, for ex-
ample in government tenders. As a result, Erdogan
reassigned hundreds of prosecutors and thousands of
police officers. When the recording of his conversation
about his corruption spread in the social media, he
temporarily shut down Facebook, Twitter and
YouTube. In addition, through the AKP media,
Erdogan created an opinion that the money confis-
cated by the police was actually for Islamic services.
Moreover, following the critical stance of Hizmet
followers, Erdogan declared that Hizmet movement
was a terrorist organization. Hundreds of members of
the movement, which consists of judges, military
generals, police officers and the ordinary followers,
were detained. Gulen himself was painted by Erdogan
media as a freemason trying to assassinate his daughter.
In fact, this despotic attitude of Erdogan was another
important and responsible factor behind the coup
(Kuru A., 2015: 21).
With regards to Egypt, despite the fact that Morsi
had only been seated in the Presidency chair for a year,
he had issued some undemocratic policies. In re-
sponse, there were several factors that triggered the
anger of society towards Morsi and which ended up
with his ousting. Firstly, he failed in accommodating a
large number of important groups in his cabinet team.
Out of 35 of his ministers, he neglected a youth
representative and a woman as minister as well as a
Christian as Vice President. His team consisted mainly
the members of FJP, which was 12 out of 35 (VOA,
2013). In November 2012, Morsi issued a constitu-
tional decree that enhanced his power and also
included a ban on judicial review of all his policies as a
president until the Egyptian constitution had been
passed. His decrees also included the immunization of
the Constituent Assembly and Shuria Council from
possible dissolution. Morsi was also accused of
attempting to control every aspect of the government
and including that of public life (Espostio, 2016:
223). These dictatorial policies instigated the masses
to conduct a huge protest. The armed forces utilized
this opportunity. Finally, on July 3, 2016, al-Sisi, the
commander of SCAF announced, that besides sus-
pending the Constitution and removing Morsi from
power, he also would appoint the head of the Consti-
tutional Court, Adly Mansour, as the Interim Presi-
dent.
THE ABSENCE OF THE UNIFYING IDEOLOGY
If we delve into the coups in both countries,
actually one of the indirect causes of both Egyptian
and Turkish turmoil was the debate over the ideology
of the state. This stemmed from the absence of the
unifying ideology that would unite all the ideological
groups that existed in each country. In the case of
both Egypt and Turkey, the absence of this uniting
philosophy in each country led to high levels of
tension and division, especially among educated
people, about national identity, and in turn, contrib-
uted significantly to instigation of coups.
Ideologically, Egyptians are divided into several
factions, being Islamist, secularist, leftist and Coptic
who account for 10 % of Egyptian population. The
Islamist themselves differ with in and from one to
another. In the wake of January 2011 revolution, there
were two Islamist parties established, namely al-Nour
party, who resort to a conservative-salafist understand-
ing of Islam and Freedom, and Justice Party estab-
lished by the Moslem Brotherhood, in which its
ideology was more moderate. Both parties were
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unified by the notion that they wanted to Islamize the
country, irrespective of their differing methods in
formal and cultural ways respectively.
On the other side, the other ideological groups
were always in fear of the Islamists whom they accused
as being an authoritarian. There was a conviction
among non-Islamist politicians that when an Islamist
sits in the position of power, he will transform into a
despotic ruler (Delkhasteh, 2016). Non-Islamic groups
also were concerned and worried about a formal
implementation of Shariah. The picture of Iran that
lives under the Islamist autocratic leadership appeared
in their imagination. These groups rejected the Islam-
ist parties, which they viewed as a politicization of
religion and which, according to them, would lead
primarily to abuse of power and monopoly of religion
over the State. Therefore, when victory was gained by
the Islamists in 2012 election, there immediately
emerged a phobia and paranoia within these groups in
Egypt. This resulted in non-Islamists activists carrying
out radical movements with the ultimate goal of
deposing Morsi and eradicating the Islamist groups.
As far as the Turkey was concerned, with the fall of
Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey was founded as
secular state in 1924. Subsequently, secularization was
enforced from top up to bottom down, in which the
state imposed secularism rigorously on the people, not
only as a value of the political system, but also as a
way of daily life. As a response to this, in the history
of Turkey, we have seen several endeavors by the
Islamists to introduce a more Islamic identity and
weaken the secular influence within politics. It is
worth noting that, those who live in countryside of
Turkey, actually never accepted secularization in
cultural life (Esposito, 2016: 29). All of the efforts of
Islamization, however, resulted and ended with a
coup. To mention more specifically, this happened to
Necmetic Erbacan, the previous Prime Minister of
Turkey, who was overthrown three times by a military
coup, namely in 1970, 1980 and 1997. Those coups
were justified by the military by claiming an accusa-
tion of violation of the Turkey Constitution.
Learning from several coups that have happened in
the history of modern Turkey and which stemmed,
primarily by the desire to revert to basic philosophy of
the state, it can be said that the absence of unifying
ideology among societies was also the determinant
cause of those coups. In the case of military coup
2016, the military’s desire to re-secularize the country
also occupies an important factor behind instigation
of the coup. It is true that there were several possible
reasons that prompted some officers of Turkey mili-
tary to undertake coup. Among prominent theories of
the underlying factors behind current coup were
firstly, it was undertaken by the military officers
because they were infiltrated by Hizmet movement
founded by Fethullah Gulen. Erdogan himself formu-
lated this theory. However, there are some absurdities
in this theory namely, the fact that Gulen himself is
civilian man living abroad and Hizmet was already
banned in 2013 (Fuller, 2016).
Second, there was a conspiracy theory where the
Western countries were violating the face of a Muslim
country. The followers of Erdogan also proposed this
theory. However, there was no evidence for this
theory. Thirdly, what seems to be the most convincing
theory for me is the desire of armed forces themselves
to restore the face of Turkey as a secular state, after it
had been “shattered” by the soft Islamisation of
Erdogan, and to retrieve the superiority of military
forces. The reasons for this theory are: firstly, it is in
line with the previous experiences of coups in Turkey
and the fact that, in the course of time and under the
Presidency of Erdogan, the military had been increas-
ingly weakened.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there are several factors that contrib-
ute to the prompting of a military coup in Egypt or
Turkey. In the case of Egypt, those factors are: the
economic decay after the fall of Mubarak, the ambi-
tion of military forces to preserve their political and
economic interests, and the traditionalist view and
pragmatic behavior of ‘ulama as well as the fear of
Islamism from the secularists and the leftist. This was
further nourished by the fact that Morsi behaved
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undemocratically. Regarding the context of coup in
Turkey, the coup was triggered mainly by the army,
who wanted to re-elevate their position after it had
been weakened by Erdogan. In addition, the coup was
also motivated by the desire of the army to retrieve
secularism as the basic philosophy of the country’s
leadership, after it had been undermined with strong
Islamization by Erdogan. The tendency by Erdogan
toward authoritarianism after his second period also
played a significant role in prompting the military
force to undertake the coup.
While the military coup in Egypt was successful,
that of Turkey failed. The success story of the military
coup against Morsi originated from the unity of
military officers, despite the fact that the army com-
mander was still new seating in his position. It was
also successful due to the strong support of the civil
society with the clergy endorsement and the approval
of all political parties. Meanwhile, the failure of the
coup d’état in Turkey was caused by the split among
army officers along with the strong refutation from
society as well as the opposition parties. The fact that
Erdogan has been charged previously by the corrup-
tion scandal and the violation of human rights still
did not prevent him from getting strong back up and
support.
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